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Abstract
Smart devices are increasingly ubiquitous; the multitude of
risks they pose to user privacy continues to grow, but assess-
ing such risks has proven difficult. In this paper, we dis-
cuss three factors which complicate the assessment of privacy
risks in the context of the smart home. Firstly, smart devices
are highly heterogeneous and hard to categorise, so top-down,
taxonomy-oriented approaches to risk assessment do not fit
well. Secondly, the threat landscape is vast, varied, and grow-
ing. Thirdly, the chief asset, personal information, is difficult
to value—especially given that its value can be hugely affected
by aggregation. To address these factors, we propose a novel,
bottom-up approach in which the smart home ecosystem is re-
duced to its data-collecting capabilities (such as sensors and
apps) and then privacy risk is assessed based on the information
that the user exposes. We define a capability-oriented model
which is system-neutral, extensible, and therefore well-suited
to the fast-evolving nature of the smart home.
1 Introduction
A smart home is a home equipped with smart devices (also
known as smart things or smart objects) [1], which are embed-
ded systems providing residents with a means to monitor and
control different features of the home. For instance, one smart
device (a sensor) might trigger another (an actuator) to alter
the state of a physical device (e.g., a motion sensor triggering a
door to be opened).
As smart home technology has evolved, smart devices have
been networked to form smart home ecosystems. These
ecosystems have enabled smart devices to combine efforts and
provide benefits beyond just convenience [2], such as smart
meters to improve energy efficiency and smart cameras trig-
gered by sensors to improve home security. The smart devices
within an ecosystem are typically networked to a central hub,
which controls the information flow between them, configured
and managed by the user via smartphone- or Web-based apps.
Smart devices are notoriously heterogeneous, largely unstan-
dardised, and communicate over various common protocols
(e.g., Bluetooth LE, ZigBee, ZWave), leading to many con-
cerns about security [3, 4, 5] and privacy [12]. Furthermore, the
information that smart devices collect can yield insights about
the user beyond what might reasonably be expected [6, 16].
However, as the popularity of smart home devices grows, it is
becoming increasingly difficult for a user to identify and un-
derstand how much personal information is being exposed, and
therefore the risks posed.
The number of distinct smart home ecosystems is increasing
as companies seek to establish themselves in the market. Dif-
ferent ecosystems may treat compatible devices and their data
differently, meaning the same device may pose different risks,
or be vulnerable to different attack vectors, depending on its
surrounding ecosystem.
Risk assessment in the smart home is complicated by the vast
threat landscape, which scales with the number of devices and
home users. Threat vectors arise from devices (which might
join or leave dynamically), their apps, communications proto-
cols, third party manufacturers and data controllers, and users.
The smart home may include multiple users with varied levels
of risk perception, any of whom may inadvertently leak infor-
mation about the others. Personal information assets are intan-
gible and difficult to protect; their value is hard to quantify and
not always apparent (e.g., it might be sold to insurers to pro-
file users and tailor policies [7]). Moreover, many users are not
keen on risk assessment, nor aware of the threats [15].
In this paper, we posit that in order to comprehensively assess
privacy risk within a smart home ecosystem, we must do two
things. Firstly, we must treat the ecosystem as an exhaustive list
of the data-collecting capabilities of its constituent parts, rather
than as a network of complex systems. Secondly, we must
consider the risk to personal information in terms of exposure,
rather than in terms of the likelihood and impact of particular
attack vectors. By doing these two things, we strip away the
complexities in both the ecosystem and the threat landscape,
allowing us to focus on what personal information could be
collected by the ecosystem and what risk it poses, rather than
on the details of how or by whom.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we review
related work on smart device taxonomies, smart home threats
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and assets (in the context of privacy), and risk models. In sec-
tion 3, we survey market-leading smart home ecosystems to
illustrate their differences in design and technology. In section
4, we define our capability-oriented model. In section 5, we
draw on sections 2 and 3 to identify three factors which com-
plicate smart home risk assessment, and then we discuss how
our model works to address them.
2 Related Work
2.1 Smart Devices & Taxonomies
The definition and categorisation of smart devices continues
to evolve as new technologies emerge. Alam et al. [9] of-
fer a taxonomy of smart devices, broadly classifying each as
either a sensor, a physiological device, or a multimedia de-
vice. However, this does not accommodate those smart de-
vices which have multiple functionalities—e.g., some smart
bathroom scales1 detect location, measure the user’s weight,
and display a local weather report, thereby placing the device
in all three categories. In this taxonomy, knowing the category
or categories into which a device is classified does not fully
describe what that device might be capable of.
Lopez et al. [10] proposed the ISAND specification, character-
ising devices based on whether they have an Identity, Sensors,
Actuators, or the ability to connect to a Network or make De-
cisions (e.g., a smart car engine which can decide when its oil
needs changing and sends a message to a display would need at
least SAD-Smart functionality). This approach better reflects
the plurality of functions that a smart device may have and,
from a risk analysis perspective, allows us to associate a more
accurate set of risks with a device based on which categories it
is classified into. Recognition of identity is important, since in-
formation from a device with a unique identifier can be linked
to a user and aggregated with other sources. However, this ap-
proach is still too coarse-grained to describe all smart devices
accurately—e.g., two devices, one with a microphone and the
other with a motion sensor, would both be classified as having
at least S-Smart functionality, but they pose different privacy
risks, since the former might record a user’s name or address,
if spoken within its vicinity, whereas the latter could not.
2.2 Smart Home Threat Landscape
Ziegeldorf et al. [6] categorise privacy threats in the wider
Internet-of-Things context and show that well-known threats
such as identification, tracking, and profiling may be greatly
exacerbated by smart technologies and that the following new
threats emerge as a result:
• privacy-violating interactions, where personal informa-
tion is transmitted over a public medium and leaked, such
as in advertising a specialist product;
• lifecycle transitions, where personal information stored on
a smart device may be accessible to another user, such as
1Nokia WiFi smart scales, https://health.nokia.com/eu/en/scales (last
accessed: December 2017).
a new owner;
• inventory attacks, where the existence and details of the
user’s personal things are collected, potentially allowing
for greater inference about that user; and
• linkage, where personal information from multiple
sources is aggregated for increased insight, potentially
with loss of context, no concern for correctness, and the
risk of data de-anonymisation.
These new threats complicate risk assessment by introducing
unexpected assets and subtle attack vectors. Risks to privacy in
the smart home are varied [12, 13, 21], including many poten-
tial side channel and metadata attacks.
ENISA [14] identifies a lack of security and privacy consid-
erations in the design stages as a concern in smart devices and
provides a comprehensive threat landscape which includes spy-
ware and adware in apps and devices, traffic monitoring, device
leakage, and server compromise. In any smart home ecosys-
tem, large amounts of exposed personal data will likely accrue
in a small number of places, such as cloud servers or mobile de-
vices; the risk posed by that data to user privacy is significant—
whether stolen by an attacker, leaked accidentally, or sold by
unscrupulous companies—because it is paired with the user
and therefore ripe for aggregation. Roman et al. [21] advocate
for privacy-by-design as a means to address these challenges.
Some smart devices are compatible with multiple smart home
ecosystems, in some cases supporting different protocols when
in different ecosystems [11] (e.g., Philips Hue lights2 are com-
patible with all of the ecosystems mentioned in §3). As such,
the same smart device may face different threats depending on
the ecosystem in which it is operating—e.g., if the ecosystem
relies on a remote server, a greater risk to data is posed by
interception or server compromise; whereas, if the ecosystem
stores data on a mobile device, a greater risk may be posed by
physical theft or malware. Thus, risk assessment in the smart
home must consider devices, their apps (many of which are
provided by third parties and may be over-privileged [2]), and
the ecosystem, as well as other sources of information.
2.3 Personal Information & Privacy Risk
Zang et al. [15] surveyed personal information leakage in mo-
bile apps and identified sixteen types of personal information at
risk (see Figure 1). The authors categorised each type as either
personally identifiable information (PII), behavioural informa-
tion, or location information to better communicate to users
what is at risk.
Creese et al. [16] illustrate the varying degrees of ease with
which one type of personal information may imply another
within online social networks, and so how sharing information
can yield greater insight than expected. They identify types of
personal information relevant to social networking, including:
ethnicity, facial biometrics, image location metadata, people
tags, online groups, and places and times of social activities.
2Philips Hue starter kit, https://www.philips.co.uk/c-p/8718696592946/
hue-white-and-color-ambiance-starter-kit-e27 (last accessed: Dec. 2017).
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Figure 1: Zang et al. [15] identified these sixteen types of
personal information.
The wider implications of privacy risk in smart devices are
considered by Arabo et al. [13], who identify many poten-
tial threats, including social engineering attacks (e.g., phish-
ing), social network attacks (e.g., child-grooming and cyber-
bullying), and identity theft. These threats highlight the real-
world importance of protecting personal information.
2.4 Smart Home Risk Modelling
Conventional wisdom in risk modelling has long been to con-
sider the likelihood and impact of attacks on a given asset [17],
with some more recent work applying this approach to risk as-
sessment in the smart home [18, 19].
Denning et al. [20] present a scenario-driven, device-centric
approach in which the risk posed to a given smart device is bro-
ken down into three components: the feasibility of the attack,
the attractiveness of the device as a compromised platform, and
the potential damage caused. Essentially, the first two express
likelihood and the third expresses impact. The authors con-
sider a wide range of assets, including emotional and societal
well-being, but concede valuation is difficult.
Jacobsson et al. [23] propose a model with emphasis on smart
home automation systems, which also relies on likelihood and
impact estimation at its core. In this model, the user is iden-
tified as the greatest risk agent. The authors suggest that in-
formation classification may help to integrate privacy-specific
issues into such models. In [19, 12], they explore the difficulty
of estimating the value of personal information. The user is
unlikely to know what information is available to be taken or
what external information might be available to increase the
value of what was taken (by aggregation). Furthermore, users
value personal information differently—e.g., Townsend et al.
[22] investigated health monitoring in older users and found
that most would trade their privacy for autonomy.
Djemame et al. [24] propose a risk assessment model for the
wider cloud service context. However, they neglect the user
perspective, which in the narrower context of the smart home
is crucial, given the influence the user has.
3 Smart Home Topologies
Smart devices and hubs (or controllers) connect to one an-
other or a remote, cloud server to share and receive data, en-
hance their effectiveness, and provide additional utility. These
smart home ecosystems are networked differently depending
on which hub is used; some examples follow.
Figure 2: The Samsung SmartThings ecosystem.
In Samsung’s SmartThings3 ecosystem, each device uses a
commonly supported protocol (e.g., ZigBee, ZWave) to talk
with a centralised hub, which remains in constant communica-
tion with a back-end cloud server over an SSL-protected proto-
col. On the server, each supported device has a corresponding
SmartDevice (a software wrapper encapsulating it) and a Smar-
tApp (which controls the SmartDevice). To manage a device,
the user installs the SmartApp on his mobile device, which
communicates with the corresponding SmartApp on the server.
This, in turn, interacts with the SmartDevice, which commu-
nicates with the physical device via the hub (see Figure 2).
Fernandez et al. [2] identified a number of security concerns
in the SmartThings framework, such as rife over-privilege in
SmartApps, many of which have since been addressed.
Figure 3: The Wink Hub ecosystem.
Wink Hub’s4 ecosystem is similar to SmartThings; each device
communicates over a common protocol with the hub, thence to
a cloud back-end over an SSL-protected protocol. To manage a
device, the user installs its app on his mobile device and com-
municates either via the cloud server or, for devices supporting
3SmartThings Developer Documentation, http://docs.smartthings.com/en/
latest/architecture (last accessed: December 2017).
4Wink Hub FAQs and Product Support, https://www.wink.com/help/faq
(last accessed: December 2017).
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the ‘local’ feature, via the router by connecting directly over
the home network (see Figure 3). Another product, Wink Re-
lay, offers a dedicated control panel to manage devices. With
regard to risk, Veracode [25] found that communications be-
tween the Wink Hub and server were vulnerable to MITM at-
tack due to a lack of TLS certificate validation; the authors also
noted that a full breach of the Samsung or Wink services would
allow an attacker access to the state of all products and services
paired with every user.
Figure 4: The Amazon Alexa ecosystem.
Amazon’s Alexa5 ecosystem implements a voice-controlled
hub which is constantly connected to a cloud back-end. When-
ever a voice command (a statement preceded by “Alexa”) is
detected, the recording is passed to the Alexa service on the
cloud server where it is parsed by a programmable skill [26]
to identify the relevant device and the action being requested
(and user authentication). The derived directive is then passed
to the user’s device cloud to execute the action (see Figure 4).
Skills can be programmed by third parties; this design allows
cross-compatibility with other ecosystems—e.g., SmartThings
hubs and devices can be controlled by voice commands using
Alexa, provided the necessary skills are installed. A similar
ecosystem, Google Home6, collects data ostensibly to improve
its services [27]; Amazon Alexa currently does not, although
this may change in the near future [28]. If transcripts are to be
shared, this poses a risk to user privacy by exposing what de-
vices are used and when; furthermore, the system detects voice
commands by identifying trigger words, which may be spoken
or detected erroneously, leading to information leakage.
Figure 5: The Apple HomeKit ecosystem.
Apple’s HomeKit7 ecosystem has a decentralised topology and
5Alexa, https://developer.amazon.com/alexa (last accessed: Dec. 2017).
6Google Home, https://store.google.com/product/google home (last
accessed: December 2017).
7iOS Security, https://www.apple.com/business/docs/
iOS Security Guide.pdf (last accessed: December 2017).
does not require a hub or back-end server. Instead, each device
may be controlled directly by its app, installed on the user’s
mobile device, over a Station-to-Station protocol. Multiple mo-
bile devices may exchange keys to share control of devices by
transferring an encrypted backup via a cloud server (see Figure
5). Apple’s upcoming HomePod8 hub adds optional centrali-
sation to the ecosystem, although technical details are not yet
available at time of writing.
4 A Model for Assessing Privacy Risk in Smart
Home Ecosystems
4.1 Model Definition
We define a component of a smart home ecosystem to be any
smart device or hub connected to that ecosystem, bounded by
and excluding the home router. We define a capability to be
any functionality provided by a component or its accompany-
ing app (e.g., the ability to measure temperature, record audio,
or take medical readings). We can therefore reduce any smart
home ecosystem to a list of its components, and thence to a list
of its capabilities.
We define a risk profile for a given capability to be a compre-
hensive risk assessment of that capability, identifying the risk it
poses to each type of personal information with which we are
concerned.
To assess privacy risk in the smart home, we assume that any
personal information exposed to the ecosystem is available to
an adversary. This enables us to strip away the complexities
of the threat landscape and focus on the types of personal in-
formation the ecosystem is capable of collecting. We do so by
first reducing it to a list of its data-collecting capabilities; since
each capability has a corresponding risk profile, we can com-
bine these risk profiles to get an overall privacy risk assessment
for that ecosystem. The model is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: A capability-oriented model for assessing privacy
risk in smart home ecosystems.
4.2 Types of Capability
To establish an exemplar list of capabilities, we surveyed com-
mercial components and compiled a bottom-up list of common
data-collecting capabilities.
8Apple HomePod, https://www.apple.com/uk/homepod (last accessed:
December 2017).
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For instance, Samsung’s SmartThings9 and Amazon’s Echo10
are two popular hubs. The former contains a hub, a motion sen-
sor, a presence sensor, a power usage sensor, and a multi-sensor
(to monitor various environmental parameters); a companion
app11 is required to control the hub and connected devices,
which requires permission to access one’s identity, contacts,
location, files, network, and camera. The latter has a built-
in microphone and an app12 requiring similar permissions, as
well as access to one’s phone and microphone. We treat each
sensor and permission as a capability, since each can collect
personal information. Both systems require the user to create
an account with an email address, password, and other optional
fields. We treat this requirement as another capability, since
users will generally submit genuine information.
To sample the range of smart home technology, we examined
three popular types of consumer device. Smart televisions13
typically have an integrated Web browser (to support online
streaming services), a microphone, and require an account and
manual activation. Smart refrigerators14 have environment and
energy usage sensors and sometimes an app15. Smart scales16
sense medical or health information, are manually activated
(insofar as the user needs to be present or connected to it), and
sometimes have a GPS-backed weather display.
By examining these and other components, we compiled an
example list of capabilities, as shown in Table 1.
4.3 Types of Personal Information
By considering the capabilities identified in Table 1 and the
types of personal information they may collect, and noting our
findings from §2.3, we compiled an example list of types of
personal information, as shown in Table 2.
4.4 Risk Profiles
For each capability in Table 1, we created a risk profile express-
ing the severity of risk posed by that capability to each type of
personal information in Table 2.
We used ‘H’, ‘M’, and ‘L’ to indicate a high, medium, or low
severity of risk, respectively, and ‘-’ to indicate no or negligible
9SmartThings Starter Kit, http://www.samsung.com/uk/smartthings/
kit-f-str-kit-uk (last accessed: December 2017).
10Amazon Echo, https://www.amazon.co.uk/Amazon-SK705DI-Echo-
Black/dp/B01GAGVIE4 (last accessed: December 2017).
11SmartThings app, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=
com.smartthings.android (last accessed: December 2017).
12Amazon Alexa app, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=
com.amazon.dee.app (last accessed: December 2017).
13LG TV, http://www.lg.com/uk/tvs/lg-OLED65W7V (l. a.: Dec. 2017);
Sony TV, https://www.sony.co.uk/electronics/4k-tvs (l. a.: Dec. 2017).
14Samsung fridge, http://www.samsung.com/us/explore/family-hub-
refrigerator/refrigerator (last accessed: December 2017); Siemens fridge,
http://www.siemens-home.bsh-group.com/uk/productlist/cooling/fridges/
freestanding-fridges/KS36VAI41G (last accessed: December 2017).
15Samsung Family Hub, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=
com.samsung.familyhub (last accessed: December 2017).
16Salter scales, http://www.salterhousewares.co.uk/salter-max-electronic-
digital-bathroom-scales-silver.html (last accessed: December 2017);
Nokia scales, https://health.nokia.com/eu/en/scales (l. a.: Dec. 2017).
Capability Notes
Microphone records audio
Camera records video and audio
Presence Sensor senses presence, motion, etc.
Environment Sensor senses temperature, light, etc.
Consumption Sensor senses usage of water, power, etc.
GPS records location
Medical/Health Reader senses medical/health information
Timed Activation turned on/off by a timer or remote user
Manual Activation turned on/off by a present user
Weather Display backed by GPS
Integrated Web Browser records browsing history
Integrated Television records viewing history
User Account email and password required
App: Access to Identity permission required
App: Access to Contacts permission required
App: Access to Microphone permission required
App: Access to Camera permission required
App: Access to Location permission required
App: Access to Network permission required
App: Access to Files permission required
App: Access to Phone permission required
Table 1: A list of common data-collecting capabilities pos-
sessed by smart home components.
Personal Information Notes


















User Presence whether user is at home and awake
User Location location of user if not at home
Table 2: A list of types of personal information which may be
collected by a smart home ecosystem.
risk. The following rules were observed to classify severities:
• low: an indirect risk with a single threat vector (e.g., a
microphone poses a low risk to medical information, since
it would only be collected if a conversation on this topic
were recorded);
• medium: an indirect risk with multiple threat vectors
(e.g., a microphone poses a medium risk to gender, age,
and routine information, since they would be collected or
strongly inferred if any conversation on a range of topics
were recorded);
• high: a direct risk, where the capability is either designed
to collect this information or requires its collection for its
intended functionality (e.g., a microphone poses a high
risk to detecting if a user is present).
We present our risk profiles in matrix form in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: A privacy risk matrix. Each row is a risk profile for a
capability, expressing the risk it poses to each type of personal
information. We use red, orange, and yellow to represent high,
medium, and low severities, respectively.
4.5 Risk Assessment Visualisations
The flexibility of our model allows for risk profiles to be com-
bined in different ways for different purposes. For instance,
Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate two risk assessment visualisations
for the same smart home ecosystem.
In Figure 8, each row represents a type of personal information
and each column a separate component in the ecosystem. Each
result shows only the most severe risk posed by that compo-
nent, based on its capabilities, to that type of personal informa-
tion. This visualisation enables the user to compare the risks
posed by each component. It could be used to identify risky
components or to see the impact of adding new components.
In Figure 9, we have mapped the values {3, 2, 1, 0} to the
severities {H, M, L, -} and then, for each type of personal in-
formation, displayed the sum of the risks posed to that type
by the ecosystem. This visualisation conveys which types of
personal information are at greatest risk in the ecosystem and
should only be used in the context of raising user awareness.
(It is not intended to imply that, for instance, two low-severity
risks strictly equate to one medium-severity risk, nor that the
largest bar poses the most significant impact.)
5 Discussion
From our findings in sections 2 and 3, we identify three factors
which complicate privacy risk assessment in the smart home.
Firstly, smart devices are highly heterogeneous and therefore
difficult to categorise; attempts to classify smart devices at a
component level are too coarse-grained and fail to fully encap-
sulate all of the personal information that the ecosystem can
collect. Secondly, smart home ecosystems are diverse and have
Figure 8: A risk assessment visualisation showing only the
most severe risks per component (indexed along the top).
Figure 9: A risk assessment visualisation showing cumulative
risk per type of personal information. We use arbitrary colours
here only to distinguish between types.
a vast and complicated threat landscape, with many (often un-
standardised) technologies and multiple users capable of leak-
ing personal information about each other. Thirdly, personal
information assets are intangible and difficult to value. Given
that personal information is stored in only a small number of
places in smart homes, densely and inter-twined, it is hard to
ascertain how much of it is obtained by the adversary in a given
attack. This means it is difficult to gauge the value of the infor-
mation obtained, since (i) internal aggregation between sepa-
rate pieces of obtained information potentially increases each
piece’s value, and (ii) external aggregation potentially yields
greater results owing to the increased number of possible ag-
gregation search keys obtained.
To address these factors, in our model we make the assump-
tion that any personal information which is able to be collected
by the ecosystem is available to the adversary and therefore at
risk. While viewing a smart home ecosystem as a list of its
capabilities does not fully describe the ecosystem, it does fully
encapsulate what information the ecosystem is able to collect.
Thus, our capability-oriented model enables one to consider
all of the personal information that an ecosystem might collect
about the user and then comprehensively assess the privacy risk
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it poses. By approaching privacy risk assessment in this way,
we address the first and second of the aforementioned factors,
because we avoid both the need to classify smart devices (we
only need to identify their data-collecting capabilities) and the
need to contend with the intricacies of the threat landscape.
We posit that conventional risk assessment models—those
which consider the likelihood and impact of attacks on a given
asset—become unsuitable in the context of privacy risk in
smart home ecosystems. Given the intangible nature of per-
sonal information and the difficulty one might have in attribut-
ing how an adversary acquired it, it should not matter whether
it is stolen, leaked, or sold—only whether it is collected in the
first place.
By stripping away complexity, our model identifies the per-
sonal information exposed to the ecosystem and enables the
user to consider the value of that information both separately
and as a whole. The user may assume that all pieces of infor-
mation can be aggregated together to yield greater value. Thus,
we address the third factor by presenting a more complete pri-
vacy risk picture of all the information which could be obtained
by the adversary, making the variability posed by internal ag-
gregation more estimable and reducing the uncertainty posed
by external aggregation. We do not consider external aggre-
gation any further, since determining precisely how much per-
sonal information is known would not be practically possible.
Our adversary is intentionally vague. We consider as an adver-
sary any actor that collects personal information about the user,
legally or illegally, and for any purpose, immediate or future;
this therefore includes both malicious attackers and arguably
benign actors (e.g., service providers and device manufactur-
ers), as even legitimate uses of personal information can leave
users feeling that their privacy has been violated (e.g., [7]).
6 Conclusion & Future Work
We have presented a model for assessing privacy risk in a smart
home ecosystem. The novel part of this model is that it reduces
an ecosystem to its data-collecting capabilities, then separately
assesses the privacy risk posed by each using pre-defined risk
profiles. This ensures that no data-collecting mechanism is
overlooked and therefore fully encapsulates what personal in-
formation the ecosystem is able to collect. We identified three
factors which complicate privacy risk assessment in the smart
home and showed that our model addresses them.
A limitation of this work is that it does not consider personal
information known to external sources, because assessing the
amount and compounding value of this information would be
impractical.
Future work might include the development of a tool to im-
plement our model. This would enable the user to model his
smart home and compare components based on the risks they
pose, with the intention that it have a positive impact on user
behaviour (Harkous et al. [8] showed similar results). It could
also highlight common threats, such as identity theft, based on
contributory factors identified in the ecosystem (risks to ad-
dress, birthday, name, etc.), which might have a greater impact
on users given its real-world relevance. Moreover, we envi-
sion that our risk profiles could be improved by incorporating
crowd-sourced information to better elicit the risks posed in
each case.
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